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 ‘FUELLED BY DREAMS AND POWERED BY IMAGINATION’: 
CONSIDERING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH THE LENS OF A 
THEOLOGY OF PLAY 
 
The Simpsons, in an episode of the eponymous cartoon series, make a trip to 
Springfield’s Mapple Store. Homer is entranced by the array of digital devices and a helpful 
sales assistant tells him that all these are “fuelled by dreams and powered by imagination.”1 
The writers capture vividly the social construction of digital technologies. Our societies are 
dependent upon digital technologies. These technologies shape our options and design-
decisions are made that reflect our changing attitudes. In a nutshell, we place a lot of faith in 
digital technologies for the lifestyles to which we have become accustomed and to which we 
aspire. Yet, at the very same time, digital innovations open wider horizons and alter our 
expectations. Digital technologies are not mere devices we use or infrastructures upon which 
we rely. Digital technologies are a cultural phenomenon conveying narratives in which are 
embedded assumptions, values and norms. We have faith in digital technologies that they will 
deliver the goods promised. Crucially, we allow the digital world scope to alter our horizons.  
Yet, as citizens, consumers, and users we are not subsumed by the digital world – we are both 
complicit and resistant. We are dutiful ‘clickers’ who follow the instructions but we are 
subversive appropriators who find our own uses for particular technologies. Like Homer, we 
are dazzled by the shiny gadgets waved in our faces by marketers – but we exercise political 
and commercial power that shapes what is offered to us. 
This paper aims to interpret digital technologies through the lens of a theology of play 
because the distinctions between work, information, and entertainment are now blurred. This 
new cultural feature requires that we add to existing richly textured theological critiques in 
order that we can be alert to, and contribute towards, robust engagement with powerful 
systems that shape contemporary society. 
We will first outline Catholic teaching on social communications, giving particular 
attention to recent Papal messages for the annual World Communications Day, before placing 
it in a wider theological context. We will argue that, whilst consideration of the entertainment 
industry is not absent from theological discussions, the propensity for entertainment and 
leisure to become a paradigm for social communications is an opportunity for a turn to other 
theological themes; namely play. Thus, our focus is not upon any digital device or software 
that is explicitly designed and marketed for play. Rather, a theology of play enables us to 
engage with the prevalence of entertainment as a mode of living in, with and through digital 
technologies. 
 
BLURRED BOUNDARIES 
 
Infotainment 
 
Interweaving informative material and entertainment content in print, broadcast and 
internet media is an extensive contemporary practice although, as David Gordon observes, an 
approach that has its origins in the sensationalist reporting of scandals and crimes in the 19
th
 
century.
2
 The neologism, “infotainment” was coined in 1980 and can be difficult to avoid 
given the pressure of media producers to secure ratings or, in the online environment, hits or 
                                                     
1
 Marc Wilmore (writer), Steven Dean Moore (director), ‘Mypods and broomsticks’, The Simpsons 
Season 20, Episode 7; Production Code KABF20. First aired: November 30, 2008. 
2
 A. David Gordon and John Michael Kitross, Controversies in Media Ethics - 2nd Edition (New York: 
Longman, 1999), 228. 
 2 
likes that, in turn, feed advertisers’ coffers. In stark terms, when it comes to editing news, 
there is the dictum, “if it bleeds, it leads.” 3  It is important, however, to recognize that 
straightforward and rigid distinctions between news and entertainment are elusive. As 
Michael Delli Carpini and Bruce Williams argue, traditional categories “are social 
constructions that tell us more about the distribution of political power than about the political 
relevance of different genres.”4 
Infotainment may, on the one hand, attract larger audiences to information because it 
has been packaged in innovative and interesting ways. So too a focus on human interest, 
jeopardy and emotion in particular, may present stories better than might a significantly 
rational, analytical approach. There is an argument that reaching people through infotainment 
is necessary in order to develop an informed democracy.
5
 On the other hand, it is feared that 
people, short on time and inclination, will imbibe only the over-simplified, trivialized and 
titillating programs or websites.
6
 
It may be that viewing infotainment makes a person objectively more informed but 
we should not discount the extent to which viewers might simply feel better informed.
7
  The 
public are, of course, not blank slates but people with often intensely emotional perspectives. 
Cynicism towards, for example, politicians and politics in general may be generated by 
exposure to infotainment that focuses on the scandals and non-political traits of politicians 
(the privatization of news). When the human interest angle is dominant in content (the 
personalization of news), there may be a reduction in cynicism.
8
  
 
Weisure 
 
US sociologist Dalton Conley coined the term “weisure” to describe that combination 
of work and leisure that features significantly in the lives of much of the professional class. 
Leisure, he argues, is instrumentalized and not only in parents’ own lives but in the 
opportunities they afford and the expectations they instil within their children: 
we certainly keep our kids busy - nearly as busy as we are ourselves. Every second is an 
opportunity for investment in their human and cultural capital - that is, in their cognitive and 
non cognitive skill sets. Our kids are not playing; rather, they are learning to socialise with 
their peers. They are not mashing clay; they are developing their manipulative dexterity in a 
three-dimensional medium. They are not kicking the ball around; no, they are physically 
challenging their fine and gross motor skill.
9
  
Weisure is more than being able to work anywhere at any time so that childcare 
might be combined with employment responsibilities (seen, for example, in the father pushing 
his daughter on a swing whilst he is making a business call on his cell). As Eran Fisher 
contends, “it also entails the fusion of creativity, joy, and personal expression into work and, 
in turn, the dealienation of work.”10 Whilst work is intruding into family life, work is also 
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being reconceived as no longer “the negation of leisure and freedom.”11 These changes have 
become possible only because of digital technologies. Although it might be tempting to think 
of online and offline as two separate domains between which we flee, retreat or navigate 
efficiently, it is perhaps more accurate to resist such “digital dualism” and deal, instead, with 
their interpenetration.
12
  
Our attempts to keep personal and business email inboxes discrete can feel like a 
losing battle. Distinguishing which of our Facebook friends are (still) professional contacts 
can be tricky, given that many of our social events might include speculative professional 
conversations. As journalist and commentator Gaby Hinsliff has pondered, “Is surfing Twitter 
work, if you're ostensibly checking for breaking news – or play, given you inevitably become 
sucked into conversation?”13 
The combination of infotainment and weisure diffuses the boundaries that once could 
be more easily drawn around learning, play and work. The effect is compounded when we use 
the same iPad for work, play, social communication and domestic activities. It may also be 
the case that we use that iPad at work, at play and at home.  
 
Professional Tools and Toys 
 
The distinction between professional device and toy is also blurred. Careful 
employers restrict the software that a user can add to a portable computer used for work – that 
the company nevertheless expects will be taken home for evening and week-end working. 
Similarly, employees are cautious, knowing their browsing can be subject to real-time and 
post hoc surveillance, about the range of uses to which they put their office laptop.  
Bond and obligation are important dimensions of toys. Where toys operate as an 
exchange we anticipate a return. Perhaps we give a toy with the expectation that we will 
receive love from its recipient. We may give toys to children in anticipation of good 
behaviour. To a considerable extent Christmas has become the “festival of toys” and we 
“judge what people think is terribly important by where they put their money.”14 It should 
come as no surprise then that the cultural cache of new models of computer produced by the 
coolest company can be drawn upon to reward favoured employees (or withhold such 
reward). Who wants to be the sole Windows Vista user at a meeting where others are 
flaunting their MacBook Airs (and possibly competing amongst themselves as to 
specifications)?  
Toys have a cultural role in preparing children for being solitary in adulthood because 
it is in being on our own that we can think issues through. Perhaps less admirably, it is a 
“solitary striving for achievement” that characterises much of contemporary life.15 Despite the 
ubiquity of online social networking and some emphasis on team work within corporations, 
the icon of contemporary business life is the diligent professional sitting alone in an airport 
lounge cocooned in her digital world with an iPad in her hand, striving to at least consolidate 
if not advance her position in the market and in her own company. 
Toys can also serve as transitional objects, providing consolation as substitute 
friends.
16
 Transitioning from intense relationships with parents is a disconcerting experience 
so a child may find that clasping a toy stands-in for the retreat to the safety of a parent’s arms 
that is temporarily unavailable. Anxiety in adults over the loss of cell or wi-fi connectivity for 
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even a short period is prevalent and may include, it is argued, some elements of grief 
reaction.
17
 
It is not that women do not derive pleasures from toys – but the gendered trope of 
“boys and their toys” is not insignificant. The stereotypical computer nerd or geek is a 
young(ish) man who derives pleasure in creating (or in the case of high-level technology, 
adapting) devices that have fallen into his hands. In designing software men may experience 
exhilaration at what technology can do.
18
 They may vicariously take on some of the properties 
of the artefacts although software designers are usually involved in only a small section of 
what is otherwise an invisible larger project. Hands-on tinkering and the “rituals of tinkering” 
(such as sharing stories at coffee breaks) contribute to the gender positioning of the 
acquisition of knowledge, skills and expertise.
19
 The comfort of total absorption and 
familiarity with a gadget forms part of a man’s emotional engagement in which he can see the 
machine as “his [sic] creation, his child, his servant, his master, his glory and his nemesis.”20 
Sherry Turkle refers to the “intimate machine” as an object experienced as alive.21 Software 
professionals have been found to address their computer in frustration, although not quite in 
the same way as those building robots do.
22
 
The blurring of boundaries described by infotainment, weisure and what we might 
call professional toys are significant social experiences that, as will now see, have not yet 
been adequately addressed in the dominant theologies of digital technologies. 
 
THEOLOGIES OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
The Magisterium on Digital Technologies 
 
Since the Second Vatican Council approved Inter Mirifica, its Decree on the media of 
social communications in late 1963, the Magisterium has returned both regularly and 
occasionally to the sphere of what have become almost exclusively digital (rather than earlier 
analogue) technologies. Communio et Progressio, the fruit of the Council’s call for further 
reflection, was published as a Pastoral Instruction in 1971 and is much more developed than 
the brief initial foray from the Council. On the twentieth anniversary of Communio et 
Progressio the Pontifical Council for Social Comunications delivered Aestatis Novae 
(February 1992) and very shortly before he died, John Paul II published his Apostolic Letter, 
The Rapid Development (January 2005). Running parallel have been the Popes’ annual 
messages to the World Communications Day, itself an outcome of Inter Mirifica. We 
consider here the Decree, Pastoral Instructions, and Apostolic Letter then, given the greater 
immediacy in a rapidly developing digital culture, we focus attention upon the last ten years’ 
annual messages. 
In what will become a recurring refrain, Inter Mirifica establishes the media of social 
communications (its preferred designation over what otherwise is too loosely the “mass 
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media”) as a gift of God; a dimension of what talented people “have made with God’s help.”23 
Both entertainment and instruction made possible through these media contribute to the 
development of societies and offer opportunities for spreading the Gospel. Recognizing that 
great harm can also ensue, the Council calls for a proper use that takes moral responsibility 
for systems that shape people’s thinking – especially when those people can be unprepared 
for its effect upon them. The “right to information” demands high standards of 
professionalism on the part of not only journalists but artists in all genres as well as producers 
and retailers, in order that people can make properly-informed critical judgements on the 
matters of their day. The backdrop of the Cold War means it is no surprise that the Decree 
places great significance on the freedom of the press. 
As its title states, the “unity and advancement” of people as social agents ought to be, 
for Communio et Progressio, the telos of technologies of communication.
24
 Through having a 
share in God’s creative power, people are to work in cooperation towards furthering the 
common good of their life together; technologies are integral to sharing knowledge and 
enabling people to work together as they become more aware of others’ lives, needs and 
aspirations. Naturally, this Pastoral Instruction is well aware that these technologies permit 
the flourishing of discord. Central to the theology of social communications is the “giving of 
the self in love”; counterposed to mere expressing ideas and emotion.25 Christ was the Perfect 
Communicator and continues to enfold people in the communion he offers in the Eucharist. 
“Mutual understanding and shared ambition” are to thus configure the proper development 
and use of technologies for widespread, if not always mass, communication.
26
  
Communio et Progressio recognizes the commercial pressures to capture an audience 
that must be resisted lest there be a downward spiral of appealing to the baser of human 
instincts (which could be best expressed as titillation, fantasy, voyeurism and schadenfreude). 
The Instruction asks the prescient question, “how can one be certain that the incessant appeal 
to emotion does not sap reason?”.27 The potential effects on public opinion are of similar 
concern, especially for pluralist societies that might give uncritical priority to the majority 
opinion which, “is not necessarily the best or the closest to the truth.”28 In the late 1960s we 
had not yet seen much infotainment so Communio et Progressio deals with news and 
entertainment in separate sections – although there is a prescience around commercial 
impetuses that had begun to move in disturbing directions. Pressures from advertisers do not 
escape the challenge of the Instruction: “unremitting pressure to buy articles of luxury can 
arouse false wants that hurt both individuals and families by making them ignore what they 
really need.”29 The extensive discussion of the role of Catholics in the media and its use in 
spreading and supporting the Gospel is not germane to our immediate discussion. 
Twenty years later, Aetatis Novae updates the same core moral principles for 
societies steeped even more deeply in “media culture” although not yet caught up in the 
explosion of digital technologies. Nevertheless, the construction of reality takes centre stage 
in moral and theological concern: “reality, for many, is what the media recognize as real; 
what media do not acknowledge seems of little importance.” 30  The privatization of 
broadcasting is seen as a retreat from a public service obligation, especially when media from 
one culture spread into others. Whilst a critical tone is present in earlier documents, Aetatis 
Novae is particularly exercised by the challenges of mass media that “exacerbate individual 
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and social problems.”31 The injustices of a “digital divide” (although not yet termed as such) 
are coming into focus as is the domination of the media by elites. The fundamental interest of 
the common good is perceived to be side-lined by commercial priorities.  
In The Rapid Development, the Word made flesh remains, as we would expect, that 
paradigmatic communication against which all human attempts at social interaction are 
measured and is also the incentive and redemptive possibility for communication with God 
and with other people.
32
 John Paul II here gives particular attention to the spread of the 
Gospel through new media including not only direct proclamation and education but through 
the manner in which Christian people communicate. The power of all media is such that both 
individuals’ ethical formation and laws and codes are required to ensure that, as far as 
possible, these forms of communication contribute to furthering the common good, most 
specifically “safeguarding the centrality and dignity of the person, the primacy of the family 
as the basic unit of society and the proper relationship among them.”33 The linked practices of 
formation, participation and dialogue need to be nurtured in order to sustain communication 
as a moral act. Jesus’ warning of judgement upon our words (Matt. 12:35-37) is used by John 
Paul II to emphasise the jeopardy. 
 In the Papal Messages to the World Communications Days the broader theological 
themes surface in more precise application to distinct, but inter-related, topics. In general 
terms, the media (here traditional as well as digital) is a “familiar guest in many homes and 
families.”34 It offers “exceptional opportunities for enriching the lives not only of individuals, 
but also of families,” in terms of “information, education, cultural expansion, and even 
spiritual growth.”35 Such appreciative observations are not without reservations for digital 
media rivals school, Church and “maybe even the home” as a source of influence.36 Whilst 
“words have an extraordinary power” so do images, particularly because the latter leave 
“lasting impressions” that shape attitudes. 37  To a considerable extent, digital media are 
constructing reality for some people.
38
 
As we have seen, the Popes have sought to affirm digital communications, not least 
because of the right to information.
39
 More specifically, digital media “help us feel closer to 
one another” so contribute to a sense of unity that may inspire solidarity and thus a more 
dignified life.
40
 The opportunity for listening and dialoguing is important in helping to break 
down walls. With its “immense possibilities for encounter and solidarity”, the Internet “is 
something truly good, a gift from God.”41 Benedict XVI felt able to talk about the creation of 
“a new ‘agora’…in which people share ideas, information and opinions” not as ends in 
themselves, but rather for the communities that come into being.
42
 Believers have 
“opportunities for prayer, meditation and sharing the word of God” but the spirit in which 
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these actions are conducted is vital: “authenticity” is vital for it points to Christ, “the profound 
source of their hope and joy.”43  
The burgeoning of digital social networks is evidence of the fundamental “human 
desire for relationship, communion and meaning.”44 Such reaching out to others arises from 
the imprint of the image and likeness of God, “the God of communication and communion.”45 
Whilst Benedict is well aware of the “ambiguity of progress”, digital communications are 
“instruments are the service of a world of greater justice and solidarity.”46  
The distortions caused by, or at least perpetuated by, digital communications are of 
particular concern in the papal messages – especially where these concern life, religion, 
morality or the family.
47
 Inter Mirifica, as we noted, had recognized that many people can 
find themselves unprepared for the influence of the media about their thinking.
48
 Benedict 
warns that distorted models of life are being imposed in some corners of the digital world,
49
 
sometimes through the weight of too much information but also via content that is partial or 
provisional truth.
50
 The homogenizing of culture that is presented in the monoculture of much 
digital media stifles, argues Benedict, creative genius, and the subtlety of complex thought. 
This has negative consequences for “the specificity of cultural practices and the particularity 
of religious belief.”51 
Commercial competitiveness contributes to lowering of standards and the problem of 
so-called “entertainment” trivializing violence.52 Economic materialism and ethical relativism 
are distortions that owe their promulgation to an “agenda dictated by dominant interests of the 
day.”53 People are wrongly encouraged to indiscriminate “self-promotion” at the same time as 
their conscience is being manipulated.
54
 In an astute observation that has relevance far beyond 
only the concerns of the church but touches upon democratic processes, Benedict recognizes 
how “truth” is given worth in terms of popularity.55 
There has been, so argues Benedict, a fundamental shift in patterns of communication 
and human relationships.
56
 So it is important to remember that communication is a human, 
not a technological achievement.
57
 Communication is integral to friendship, to respect and to 
dialogue and it is to the service of these high callings that the media is to be subject.
58
 With 
this in view, believers and people of good will are encouraged to remember that the digital 
world is not a parallel or purely virtual world.
59
 Benedict is asserting the continuity of 
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virtuous behavior and character that ought to be expected by people as they live in both 
digital and analogue worlds. Whatever “realities” might be digitally constructed the key 
component is always direct human relations.
60
 Christians’ presence on the cyberspace 
highways is important and is to be guided by “concrete present and engaging” love for all.61 
Here, as elsewhere, Christians are called to exercise a “diaconia of culture.”62 This requires 
not only authenticity but a discipline of silence that resists perpetual and premature chatter, 
particularly developing the capacity to listen as a form of respectful evangelization.
63
 It is 
this, in many ways counter-cultural, approach to digital media that Francis picks up in his first 
such message: “those who communicate, in effect, become neighbours.”64 
The ethical injunctions and guidance from the Magisterium are welcome in their 
affirmation of digital communications technologies whilst being alert to the great potential for 
harmful distortions – of news, information, and attitudes to violence. All these bear upon the 
dignity of human persons that properly requires to be defended. However, the communicator 
and the person communicated to, be she Christian or not, is assumed to be rather more free to 
critically engage with technology than is perhaps really the case. The paradigm of Divine 
communication has, in this respect, its limits. The capacity of God to communicate with 
human persons, when used analogously tends to diminish the hurdles of social 
communication. It is not merely that the hurdles are higher but that people are disabled by the 
technological paradigm or culture and so are hindered in both overcoming the hurdles and, 
more profoundly, being aware that they are even in a race. Odorless noxious fumes are 
acutely dangerous not only because we are unaware of being slowly poisoned but the fumes 
alter our cognitive capacity to realize what is happening to us even once some side-effects 
become apparent. It is this dimension that appears more prominently when we consider 
broader theologies of technology. 
 
Other Theologies of Technology 
 
Russian Orthodox theologian, Nicholas Berdyaev contends in the 1930s that 
inventions bear witness to man’s creativeness therefore are good and valuable but whilst 
testifying to man’s strength and power over nature thereby liberating man, these inventions 
also weaken and enslave in their mechanisation of human life.
65
 The desire for power, puts 
technology as a power over the self wherein we sacrifice our humanity for the sake of power 
for, as Bedyaev argues, “the will to justice is overcome by the will to power.”66 As a result, 
people are being dehumanized by machines.
67
 “Technical 
civilization,” says Berdyaev, turns us into machines as it “demands that man shall fulfill one 
or other of his functions, but it does not want to reckon with man himself - it knows only his 
functions.”68 Technology and capitalism have enslaved through “the dictatorship of money.”69  
George Grant, a Christian philosopher in Canada active from the mid-1940s through 
the mid-1980s, is critical of the dream to be masters over the earth which is being attempted 
by bringing the sciences and the arts into a new unity.
70
 We can see, he argues, the 
interweaving of political and social decisions with "the pursuit and realization of 
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technological ends.”71 We want to make our own future but, says Grant, that vision is itself 
bound up within a technological mindset: “we apprehend our destiny by forms of thought 
which are themselves the very core of that destiny.”72  
It is French sociologist and Protestant theologian, Jacques Ellul who has championed 
the criticism of the technological dream of every more efficient production (and, 
consequently, life). Using his now famous notion of La technique Ellul gives an account of 
the automatism of technical choice.
73
 Technology is self-augmenting,  “progressing almost 
without decisive intervention by man.”74  One disastrous consequence occurs in the morality 
of technology: “technique never observes the distinction between moral and immoral use. It 
tends, on the contrary, to create a completely independent technical morality”. 75  
Implementing technology in striving for efficiency can result in bad effects (such as industrial 
accidents or deliberate disregard for the safety of people and the natural environment); the 
tragedy is compounded by the use of more technology to address the negative outcomes.
76
  
Efficiency demands that people are turned into means to an end; we are, claims Paul 
Tillich, “becoming tool[s] for the production of tools.”77  This is catastrophic for, Tillich 
contends, “the person is the end that cannot become means without being destroyed” and this 
is true also of the kingdom of God: “the meaning of…the kingdom of God is not the unity of 
things or their functions, but it is the unity of persons, including their relationship to the 
whole nonpersonal realm.”78 In what Catholic philosopher and playwright, Gabriel Marcel 
terms “desacralization,” technology strips life of its sacred attributes.79 
Such criticisms are bad enough but Martin Heidegger argues that our capacity to 
interpret technology is itself profoundly compromised. Humanity stands within a 
technological enframing and the capacity to question technology is profoundly hindered 
because man is part of, and sees from the standpoint, of the technological. The only 
possibility is that art, specifically our reflection upon art, might enable us to question 
technology.
80
 
Following in the footsteps of Heidegger and Ellul, Protestant philosopher of 
technology, Albert Borgmann, finds technology to be disburdening or unencumbering people 
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from the trials and tasks of life; tasks that hitherto deepened our appreciation of life because 
these involved effort and connection with nature and, often direct human interaction. Devices, 
in Borgmann’s framework, make commodities such as warmth, transportation or food, etc., 
available with few demands upon us with the effect that “our once profound and manifold 
engagement with the world is reduced to narrow points of contact in labour and 
consumption.”81 Our experience of the world’s contingency is, argues Borgmann, reduced by 
technologies. He does not contend that, for example, the protection brought about by vaccines 
is morally regrettable. Nevertheless, he believes that such disengagement “greatly 
complicates the task of recovering a region of contingency and habitual grace.”82 
There is, however, a counter discourse that attends to the liberating and creative 
dimensions of technology. Alongside desires for efficient exploitation of resources, 
technology bears much of the weight of our dreams for liberation. It cannot be denied that life 
in a pre-technological world was harsh. Technological developments have liberated many 
(although not all) from “servitude to matter” and, now, argues Clarke, the liberated spirit of 
man turns back to the material world, to dominate in a new (active) way; for creative self-
expression and self-realisation.
83
 The use of man’s new found power ought to be according to 
the proper ordering of values, in other words for the expression and fulfilment of man’s 
higher and more spiritual capacities.
84
 Technology is to serve the light of the spirit with self-
denial as a moderating influence. However, Clarke mistakenly views technology as “morally 
neutral instruments.”85 
Whereas technology has the dual potential to liberate and demonise, the blame is 
placed by Tillich at misuses by capitalism.
86
 He places technology in the eschatological hope 
of the unity of humanity through its possibilities of liberation from the bounds of space and 
time.
87
 In somewhat similar vein, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin famously contends that 
technology offers liberation from our detachment from one another.
88
 The evolution of human 
consciousness is continuing, and into maximum complexity. Despite our warring, and as a 
consequence of our attempts to detach ourselves, we are, says Teilhard, mingled more and 
more together. “Planetized humanity” is his belief in the total reflexion of the planet upon 
itself which in, something akin to telepathy, there is direct psychic convergence of members. 
This leads to a domain of supervision and ideas, the noossphere; a whole greater than the sum 
of its parts in which everything (from rocks to people) takes on holistic importance. 
Against liberation from bodies and materiality (as is envisioned by much cyborg 
writing), practical theologian Elaine Graham posits “the fabricated, technologized worlds of 
human labour and artifice as equally capable of revealing the sacred as is the innocence of 
‘nature’.”89 Graham’s Christian feminist concern for embodiment is not at the expense of 
technological developments for she recognises bodily augmentation (sometimes for the 
restoration of capacities lost through disease or injury).
90
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Technology also carries within it our dreams of creativity. Berdyaev writes of an 
“ethic of creativeness” which is our response to the call of God to deploy the joint gifts of 
intelligence and the materials available in the world.
91
 Lutheran systematic theologian, Philip 
Hefner, draws on the idea of the human as “the created co-creator” in his discussions of 
technological achievements.
92
 In this respect, it is vitally important to recognize the social 
systems within which such creativity (including digital media) is exercised. Physicist-
theologian, Ian Barbour’s contextual interaction of science, society and technology makes this 
point well.
93
  
Creativity may often be exercised in the teeth of resistance to any challenge to models 
of technological efficiency although, as Ellul expresses in his theological work, The Meaning 
of the City, the situation, in Christ, is not without hope: “God, by his act in Jesus Christ, made 
the city into a neutral world where man can be free again, a world where man finds 
possibilities for action.” 94   Creativity is not, then, merely a case of technological 
inventiveness but is closely linked to a spirit of Christian mortification that resists “mere 
gratification of man’s inferior appetites.”95  This approach demands that the technologist 
“transcends the obsession of number”96 and recovers a quality of inwardness that, important 
for Marcel, is inter-subjectivity.
97
  
 
Theologies of Technology for Digital Cultures of Blurred Boundaries 
 
Theologies of technology always respond to specific contexts. Without suggesting 
that the digital contexts of the early 21
st
 century are wholly discontinuous with those that have 
come before there are, at the very least, some different emphases. The pessimistic theologies 
of technology quite naturally reflect concerns over the automation of industrial manufacturing 
processes, much of which was enveloped by militaristic ambition, that brought economic and 
social consequences in the early 20
th
 century with the loss, in Europe and North America, of 
many opportunities for low-skill employment. Detrimental effects on the environment 
through pollution were poorly publicised although devastating for the lives of those affected. 
Technologies in the home, not least the washing machine, changed the possibilities for 
women which conservatives perceived to be a fracturing of “family life.” Hanging over 
everyone’s head from 1945 was the threat of nuclear and biological warfare; the catastrophic 
potential of technological achievements. 
To view digital technologies as truly a gift from God requires a nuanced appreciation 
of what is a quite ambiguous “gift”. First and foremost, we must not mistakenly conceive of 
those gifts as tools. What God has gifted, through the creative genius of humanity, also shapes 
its recipients. The depth of such formation is not consistent across all the various contexts in 
which different devices are used. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s critique warns us that our very 
thinking about technologies is undertaken within a technological paradigm. We may have so 
internalized technological values and perspectives that these have become our worldview, the 
same worldview by which we seek to critically engage with and evaluate digital cultures. The 
Magisterial theology of digital technology gives insufficient weight to this conundrum. The 
very people whose unity and advancement might be engendered through digital technologies 
are men and women who are not merely immersed in technological culture but are saturated 
by it. The communicating “self given in love” is not a person who can be abstracted from the 
mental, social, political and spiritual shaping by the paradigm of digital technologies. At the 
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same time, we ought not lose sight of the residual capacity of digitally-shaped people to 
reflect upon their being shaped. We are, for the meantime, far from being automatons. 
As much as the Magisterium grapples with the effects of digital technologies upon 
social and economic life, the teaching conveys the impression of a world in which many 
boundaries remain intact. It is all well and good to talk about work, family, home, politics, 
and entertainment, and recognize that these are impacted by digital technologies for better and 
for worse. However, times have moved on and the blurring of the boundaries between these 
different domains demands additional theological perspectives. It is the contention of this 
paper that theologies of play offer a paradigm that facilitates our resistance to being subsumed 
by, and not just submerged in, digital cultures. 
 
PLAY 
 
When the boundaries between information and entertainment, work and leisure, and 
professional tools and toys are blurred, a turn to theologies of play holds potential for sharper 
insight. It is important to remember that in this paper we are not discussing technology that is 
presented as children’s or adults’ toys (e.g. toddler computer / video-gaming systems) – 
although these are important. Our interest is in the “positioning strategies” that we adopt and 
are required of us as people who engage with digital technologies within the often ill-defined 
culture of infotainment, weisure and professional toys.
98
 Following a theory of the social 
construction, rather than any determinism, of technology we bring attention to the choices 
that people between technological options; options that depend on social interaction.
99
 
Similarly, we are not reducing our positioning of technologies to toys and play and nothing 
more, but are recognizing this attitude, and form of engagement with our experience of 
technologies.  
 
Theories of play 
 
In the late Eighteenth Century Friedrich Schiller attempted an early formulation of 
play that relied on the correlation between the two instincts or impulsions he had theorized. 
The first he calls the sensuous, the other he names as the formal instinct. The sensuous 
instinct arises from our physical existence and thus encloses us in time. The formal instinct 
comes from our rational nature and, in its maintaining of our personality amidst all the 
changes we experience, sets us free from time.
100
 Furthermore, whilst the sensuous impulsion 
wants to be shaped by what it receives, the formal instinct is set towards self-determination; 
rather than receiving, the formal impulsion wishes to produce an object.
101
 These two instincts 
are correlated with neither dominating lest we lose our stability as a person. It is play that 
unites these drives, albeit paradoxically – inside and outside time, facilitating change and 
displaying identity, and exercising constraints whilst setting free. Schiller thus makes his 
famous dictum: “Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is 
only wholly Man when he is playing.”102  
Play as a basic category for all human studies was the approach taken by Johan 
Huizinga in Homo Ludens, first published in Switzerland in 1949. For Huizinga the “spirit of 
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playful competition” produced many fundamental forms of life with play serving as a 
metaphor for social meaning.
103
 Play is thus beyond the dichotomy of serious/not serious: 
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite 
consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not serious,” but at the same time absorbing the 
player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit 
can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according 
to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.
104
 
Unsurprisingly, this definition is contested. Roger Callois, a French philosopher, found it 
simultaneously “too broad and too narrow” as well as missing the role of play in exposing 
mystery and secrecy.
105
 Huizinga’s exclusion of material interest also, argues Callois, 
excludes betting, lotteries and the like. In differentiating games with respect to competition, 
chance, simulation and thrill-seeking Callois proffers a definition of play by which it is 
marked out as free, separate, uncertain, unproductive, governed by rules and make-believe.
106
  
Play can be a means of handling trauma; a person has a compulsion to repeat 
symbolically experiences that were not sufficiently managed in the past. Some play might be 
an opportunity for catharsis in which pent-up or surplus emotions from the past are released. 
From a functional perspective, play can be preparation for the future; a person exercises new 
faculties. Erikson’s focus is upon the toy world of childhood imagination: “to use objects 
endowed with special and symbolic meanings for the presentations of an imagined sense 
in a circumscribed sphere”.107 In this ritualized procedure we dare a new chance that 
enables someone to alter both their thinking and their feeling about their past, present and 
future. Play is thus a “capacity for imagining different scenarios which may serve as 
make-believe in the search for a fitting vision and yet can take over to the point where the 
cognitive as well as the emotional quality of action is changed.”108Brian Sutton’s claim for 
play is persuasive: 
play is deceptive; it is a vehicle for antithetical purposes. It is the primitive communication 
system par excellence through which you can express and communicate all the longings, 
furtive wishes, glorious dreams, hopeless fears, that cannot be expressed in everyday 
arrangements…In play, more than anywhere else, apart from madness, the player can escape 
the usual orthodox links between signs and their referents.
109
 
 
Theologies of Play 
 
Christian traditions have been both wary of play and appreciative of its merits (within 
limits). Whilst recent explorations have wrestled with play’s possibilities for reflecting God’s 
nature and, in the face of political oppression, wresting a vision of hope in a different future, 
there is a tradition of a call to seriousness that sees a need for conversion from a life of play. 
St Chrysostom took the world to be a theatre, but not one in which we are to laugh but “to 
weep for our sins.”110 Whilst some might sarcastically express their preference that God give 
them opportunities for laughing Chrysostom dispenses a rebuke: “It is not God who gives us 
the chance to play, but the devil.” For Augustine, even eating is sinful if done in a spirit of 
pleasure; the only proper enjoyment is enjoyment of God.
111
 He seems to be caught up with 
how one can know one is eating only enough for sustenance and health rather than eating for 
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enjoyment (which is closely associated with excess). Use of all good things, for example, 
music, apparel or utensils is to be both moderate and necessary. Sport, here coursing or 
watching a lizard, must lead to praise to God otherwise it is a diversion and thus a sin. In a 
similar vein the 16
th
-17
th
 century Puritan William Law wrote of the “poorness of all worldly 
enjoyments” where he prefers to see pain and sickness as a greater call to God. Nevertheless, 
we may profit by the follies of the world as they may point, albeit inadvertently, to the 
greatness of religion and to the happiness of another life.
112
 Like Augustine, Law calls for “a 
religious exactness in the use of…innocent and lawful things.”113 The Reformer John Calvin, 
not generally ascribed with a cheery approach to life, offers a nuanced perspective on 
Augustinian severity. We are to use God’s gifts to the end to which God created them. These 
have been created for our good, not our ruin. On food in particular “we shall find that [God] 
meant not only to provide for necessity but also for delight and good cheer.”114 Similarly 
respecting trees and fruit, their “beauty of appearance and pleasantness of odour” prevent 
both narrow-mindedness and immoderation. 
By no means did Chrysostom’s and Augustine’s approach prevail to the exclusion of 
all others. Gregory of Nazianzus had made the audacious claim that “the Logos on high plays, 
stirring the whole cosmos back and forth as he wills, into shapes over every kind.”115 The 12th 
century Saxon canon Hugh St Victor claimed that serious things taste better if spiced with 
kindly mockery.
116
 His near contemporary, John of Salisbury considered there to be 
something wrong with a po-faced person: “It is a pleasant thing and in no way contrary to a 
good man’s honour that he should here and there unbend and be moved by seemly mirth.”117 
However, this strand was not ignorant of mirth’s capacity to run away with itself; loss of 
control was inappropriate. As Hildebert of Le Mans counselled, “Permit thyself a few jests in 
the midst of thy serious work, but even they jesting should be carried out in a worthy 
manner.”118 
Christian piety has been not a little eager in its disciplinary impetus to marshal the 
threat of idleness. The common phrase of recent years, “the devil finds work for idle hands” 
has evolved in variants but Isaac Watt’s early 18th century song for children captures the 
mood well: “In works of labour or of skill, / I would be busy too; / For Satan finds some 
mischief still / for idle hands to do.”119 To powerful rhetorical effect preachers such as John 
Wesley glorified work against the dangers of idleness and praised honest industry that 
generated income to be wisely, not frivolously spent:  
despise delicacy and variety, and be content with what plain nature requires. Do not waste any 
part of so precious a talent merely in gratifying the desire of the eye by superfluous or 
expensive apparel, or by needless ornaments. Waste no part of it in curiously adorning your 
houses; in superfluous or expensive furniture; in costly pictures, painting, gilding, books; in 
elegant rather than useful gardens.
120
 
Wesley’s exhortation appeals to the dominical injunction to “let the dead bury their dead”; the 
disciples of the Lord are on a more urgent mission to which no restraining attachments are 
permissible.  
Coming to more contemporary commentators, Robert Johnson has given particular 
attention to Genesis 1-11, the Sabbath ordnance and Wisdom Literature with respect to play. 
In finding every tree pleasant, vines producing wine that gladdens the heart and oil as a sign 
of gladness  (Gen 2:9 and Ps 104), Johnson leaves behind a utilitarian approach to the natural 
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world. The Sabbath is a call to abstain from work, not as is often presented, a call to worship. 
Johnson sees the Sabbath as a parenthesis which had no outside design; an instance of play in 
which “its non-instrumentality proved productive.”121 Recognising life as a gift as well as a 
task the Sabbath-play has ethical significance in allowing servants and labourers to rest and 
be refreshed. The community is thus “freed for the Sabbath by the even of the Exodus.”122 In 
Ecclesiastes Johnson finds a God whose sovereignty frees people to enjoy, rather than having 
to attempt a futile control of, life.
123
 Play, he argues, is “preparatory to our experience of 
God” but one may also find joy in labour.124  
For Hugo Rahner the creation of the world and of humanity is meaningful although 
not necessary.
125
 Drawing on Proverbs 8:22-31 he interprets Wisdom rejoicing before the 
LORD and Wisdom’s delight in humanity in terms of play.126 Humanity is playing too, for 
people are both of heaven and earth. Play captures these dual, but not dichotomous, 
dimensions of being “grave-merry.” 127  The church is playing for there is nothing of 
compulsion or calculation in the origin of the church.
128
 Ecclesia is the True Eve
129
 and 
liturgy is the divine game.
130
 This re-sets our perspective in a way that is not a denial of the 
world but a vital aspect of not being tied down by the world. Christians are able to serve the 
world more faithfully – although we must not mistake the productivity of such play by 
instrumentalizing it: 
In play earthly realities become, of a sudden, things of the transient moment, presently left 
behind, then disposed of and buried in the past; the mind is prepared to accept the unimagined 
and incredible, to enter a world where different laws apply, to be relieved of all the weights 
that bear it down, to be free, kindly, unfettered and divine.
131
 
Rahner attempts to respond to the reasonable criticism of Christians laughing when they 
ought to be weeping. He finds that the Christian adoption of the Greek serious-serene man to 
be standing between two extremes: the bomolochus who jokes at every turn to gain a meal or 
two, and the agroikos whose disposition was one of course stiffness. Eutrapelia is “play for 
the sake of seriousness”.132  
For Rahner we play to reflect God’s nature, for the sake of our good health, to raise 
our imagination above the mundane and to relativize any self-importance that is really a lack 
of faith in God’s glory. Similarly, David Miller argues that we should see play in its breadth: 
“play is not only a dimension of knowing but also a dimension of living and feeling and 
willing, in short, a way of being.”133  Play has a crucial contribution to our envisaging our 
future as well as describing our present circumstances in terms other than within the 
constraints of language.
134
 
Brazilian liberation theologian Rubem Alves has identified the political importance of 
play. Alves sees play as a way of subverting dominant values that are being imposed upon us. 
He finds Jesus refusing to play the game in not preserving the past in the present but opening 
the present to the future through becoming like little children (who play). Play is “non-
productive activity” and it delivers pleasure.135 Play subverts the idea that power is the answer 
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to overcoming others’ power: “We are trapped not for lack of power, but by the unmatched 
effectiveness of our irrationality.”136 By playing, with its consequence for roles, we are able to 
envisage ways of living together that embodies God’s forgiveness. In this sense play is, for 
Alves, an aperitif reminding us that our destiny is not confined to this world: 
by being the playing community, [the church] becomes the ‘aperitif’ offered to the world. 
After the world tastes it, its imagination is to run wild, free from the yoke of the logic of 
production and consumption which repressed it. Has not this liberation of imagination 
something to do with metanoia, repentance?
137
 
Through play we resist control of our imagination, particularly when this is exercised for the 
commercial interests of the state.
138
 Play thus has ethical and prophetic significance for it 
makes “a radical denial of the logic of the adult world,”139 challenging it with a utopian 
element. In play we see with the heart.
140
 As Alves so vividly declares, “hope is hearing the 
melody of the future. Faith is to dance to it.”141 
With similar concerns to those of Alves, Jürgen Moltmann addresses the question of 
how Christians can be playing in the face of suffering across the world.  His response is 
multi-faceted, with a liberation agenda that requires breaking play from the grip of ruling 
authorities. People’s minds and bodies are kept captive by messages that current conditions 
are what they are so the “fetters of inevitability of that which is” need to be shaken off.142  
Liberating play rests on God’s creation of the world in order to enjoy it: “creation is a 
play of [God’s] groundless and penetrating wisdom.” 143  This theme is carried over into 
Moltmann’s interpretation of the eschatological question. Whilst it is tempting to think of the 
End as the completion of a project or the fulfilment of a goal this, according to Moltmann, a 
mistaken framing. To achieve a goal is indeed an end point – but therein lies the problem. 
Once achieved, the goal passes behind us and we are left with either purposelessness or, as we 
do in this life, seek other goals to work towards. If there is a final goal then it would be far 
better to keep seeking to reach it rather than to complete it. In eschatological terms, “the 
vision of heaven is horrifying for a life which is made meaningful only by a goal, because it 
offers something like eternal boredom.”144 Instead of conceiving the eschatological hope in 
terms of a goal it needs to be viewed as purposeless, “as a song of praise out of unending joy, 
as a round dance filled with variations, as the consummated harmony of body and soul.”145  
So, liberation is from subjection to goals and achievements.
146
 
 
 
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND A THEOLOGY OF PLAY 
 
We are now in a position to present the benefits of including a lens of a theology of 
play for considering digital technologies. The tradition of a call to seriousness demands that 
we have second thoughts about the expenditure we make on our technological “toys.” We 
have to take for granted the built-in obsolescence of many devices but we are left wondering 
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just how excessive might be our personal financial investment. It is also true that many of our 
devices are used in multiple contexts (for work as well as pleasure) so it is difficult to make 
fair judgments about what we spend on them. We ought not, of course, lose sight that the 
information brought to us about these devices is itself often packaged as infotainment.  
Questions of solidarity, that have featured prominently in magisterial teaching on 
social communications, also take a further turn when we think of “excess.”  Devices that 
enable – and perhaps encourage – solidarity across economic and international boundaries 
may be assembled in production plants that rely on a low-wage economy. Playing with, and 
through, technologies that are partly the result of other people’s labour in less than dignified 
contexts has to give us pause for thought. Nero has traditionally been criticized for fiddling 
whilst Rome burned. It is not wholly hyperbolic to perhaps find ourselves guilty of clicking 
whilst communities of low-paid workers toil. This is not to negate claims and hopes for 
solidarity but a call to seriousness in the face of a culture of play and entertainment reminds 
us that solidarity is not universal and, even when it might occur, the already poorest workers 
may be paying a high price. 
As we have seen, a gift of mirth can be counterpoised to seriousness. However, 
authenticity and integrity are practiced in digital cultures that give great prominence to satire, 
cynicism and, at worst, cyber-bullying by Internet trolls. Racist or misogynist “humour” 
appears to have no adverse effect on people who are neither racist nor misogynist. But, highly 
significantly, such “joking” appears to validate such attitudes in those already holding them, 
giving people a perceived “permission” to express what they might otherwise keep to 
themselves.
147
 Mirth is both a highly valuable dimension of human experience and fraught 
with issues of power. It is difficult enough in routine social encounters amongst friends to 
always be confident that joking and banter remain a positive experience for everyone in the 
group. Using humour to diminish another person, to get an advantage over them or to secure 
one’s own position with a group is an everyday practice. In the rough and tumble of 
friendships such jostling for approval is grist to the mill and often distributed with an equity 
that is largely policed by the group. Given that the infotainment, weisure and professional 
toys consistently blur boundaries it is much harder to combine mutual protection and jesting.  
By refusing to romanticize or idealize play we can have some hope that distinct 
boundaries might be recovered – even if the boundaries are flexible and gradients rather than 
sharp edges. The cruelty of school playgrounds, often continued around the water-cooler in 
office environments years later, is a salutary reminder of the power of play. It is little surprise 
that the degree of anonymity that online activities can appear to offer exacerbates the 
detrimental aspects of mirth. Once again, it is the blurring of boundaries between digital and 
non-digital worlds that means we have to be alert to the ways in which poisonous denigration 
of individuals and groups leaches from one dimension to the other. It is insufficient to 
relegate online abuse to a supposedly sequestered digital space from which victims can be 
told simply to avoid.  
As we have seen, some theologies of play have been particularly concerned with 
idleness. In the world of weisure it has very from clear what being idle now means. Whilst it 
could be tempting to resort to the tradition of Sabbath, also a significant theme in theologies 
of play, it is once more the blurring of boundaries that makes this problematic. There might 
be circumstances in which Christians would attempt to decouple weisure into more rigidly 
distinct compartments of work and leisure. However the expectations (and veiled threats) of 
managers in a competitive employment market bear heavily upon many people – Christian 
worshippers included. Some are more discrete than others, but people checking work emails 
on a smartphone during Mass is not an uncommon practice. The dignity of the person is 
diminished when not even worship is a protected space. Whilst vociferous debates rage over 
the separation of church and state there is remarkably little defence of a separation between 
church and commerce.  
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The role of digital technologies in creative imagining is largely absent from current 
theologies of technology. At most we find an appreciation of the liberation from actions of 
brute existence that technologies have brought. This liberation is not generally extended to the 
mind and envisioning of the alternative futures. There are, extensive visions of digital futures 
featuring Artificial Intelligence and human-machine integration in cyborg bodies. However, 
the possibility of digital technologies enhancing our playful creative imagination is not a 
sufficiently overt theme in theological frameworks. We need to recover play within digital 
environments as well as deploying it as a theological critique. It is perhaps only through 
appreciating the gift of play more fully that we will be motivated to at least begin to reinstate 
the boundaries subsumed by weisure and infotainment. Here we would have a re-invigorated 
theological critique of the instrumentalization of play – and of human beings as a whole – in 
digital cultures. A divine call back to purposelessness would need to be differentiated from 
the despair of nihilism but would be a recovery of the playing-human. 
Genuine play made possible within our properly purposeless life in Christ offers the 
critical traction denied to those enclosed within a technological paradigm. We may not be 
able, or indeed need, to fully reconstitute the boundaries of information, entertainment, work 
and leisure but playing, alone and with others, at least puts us in another mode of being for a 
time. Worship, if it too can be freed from its all too common framing as a task or duty, is 
another practice of the human-at-play. 
There is, of course, a paradox in suggesting that play can be a critical tool towards 
digital technologies. Such a stance would seem to instrumentalize play once again and nullify 
its purposelessness. The paradox is only problematic if we set out to play with the goal of 
availing ourselves of its benefits. We can play simply for the sake of it – perhaps, we might 
say, even for God’s sake – and yet benefit from play’s by-products. God’s playing, in its free, 
unconditioned, abandonment gives us a paradigm for our purposeless, yet useful, play. The 
universe that resulted from God’s playing was not necessary – yet no less important for being 
so. The human at play benefits, not least through liberating her imagination – but does not 
play in order that she be liberated. 
Our condition – shaped by digital technologies and shaping them – is too serious for 
us not to play. That play may be with or by means of digital technologies but it may also 
involve some divesting of devices for a time. Either way, we need God’s gift of play in order 
to handle God’s gift of digital technologies. 
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